MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Dr. Jacob Stockfisch, OSD, on the Projected
          Review of Soviet Ground Forces

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1. At his request, Dr. Jacob Stockfisch from Mr. Enthoven's
staff visited my office on 22 March 1963 to discuss problems relating
to the Special Ground Forces Project requested by Secretary McNamara.
[redacted] also were present. After
a general exchange of information on where the request stands at present,
the reasons for the DOD interest, and the problems and history of Soviet
ground forces intelligence estimates, I outlined to Dr. Stockfisch my
views on the general guidelines to be observed as follows:

    a. The project should be limited to the counterpart of the
US army ground forces part of the US General Purpose Forces, that is,
the Soviet ground forces. Tactical surface-to-surface missiles
and tactical surface-to-air missiles would be included, but the
Tactical Air Forces and army aviation would be specifically
excluded.

    b. The report of the project would be neither an estimate
nor a net evaluation in the usual technical sense. Moreover, the
time limits are such that the scope of the preliminary report
should not, nor could not, in any practical sense attempt to answer
the full range of questions suggested by the request. Rather, the
preliminary report should, in my view, focus on a selected number
of key objectives. Within the limits of these objectives, the
preliminary report should result in establishing the low end of
the range of uncertainty by fixing levels that can be supported
by reasonably hard evidence. Establishment of other possibly or
probable alternative levels would be made to aid the estimators
in formulating their judgments and aid the planners by quantifying
the uncertainties. Further, cogent comparative US data should be
developed to aid in understanding areas where much substan-
tial real differences (a division is not a division – with apologies
to Gertrude Stein) and to assist the net evaluation process.

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